Culture, salience, and psychiatric diagnosis: exploring the concept of cultural congruence & its practical application by Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed
Rashed Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2013, 8:5
http://www.peh-med.com/content/8/1/5RESEARCH Open AccessCulture, salience, and psychiatric diagnosis:
exploring the concept of cultural congruence &
its practical application
Mohammed Abouelleil RashedAbstract
Introduction: Cultural congruence is the idea that to the extent a belief or experience is culturally shared it is not to
feature in a diagnostic judgement, irrespective of its resemblance to psychiatric pathology. This rests on the argument
that since deviation from norms is central to diagnosis, and since what counts as deviation is relative to context, assessing
the degree of fit between mental states and cultural norms is crucial. Various problems beset the cultural congruence
construct including impoverished definitions of culture as religious, national or ethnic group and of congruence as
validation by that group. This article attempts to address these shortcomings to arrive at a cogent construct.
Results: The article distinguishes symbolic from phenomenological conceptions of culture, the latter expanded upon
through two sources: Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of background intentionality and neuropsychological
literature on salience. It is argued that culture is not limited to symbolic presuppositions and shapes subjects’
experiential dispositions. This conception is deployed to re-examine the meaning of (in)congruence. The main
argument is that a significant, since foundational, deviation from culture is not from a value or belief but from
culturally-instilled experiential dispositions, in what is salient to an individual in a particular context.
Conclusion: Applying the concept of cultural congruence must not be limited to assessing violations of the symbolic
order and must consider alignment with or deviations from culturally-instilled experiential dispositions. By virtue of
being foundational to a shared experience of the world, such dispositions are more accurate indicators of potential
vulnerability. Notwithstanding problems of access and expertise, clinical practice should aim to accommodate this
richer meaning of cultural congruence.
Keywords: Cultural congruence, Cultural learning, Diagnosis, DSM, Ethnography, Experiential dispositions,
Intentionality, Phenomenology, Psychiatry, SalienceIntroduction
A certain insight has made some headway within psych-
iatry. In 1994, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) stipulated that religious beliefs
are not delusions if “ordinarily accepted by other members
of the person’s culture or subculture” ([1], p. xxiv) and
“hallucinations may … be a normal part of religious experi-
ence in certain cultural contexts” (p. 275). More recently,
consultation papers for the DSM-5 [2] acknowledged that
in some clinical encounters there will be “difficulty in
making a diagnostic judgment, owing to a significantCorrespondence: m.rashed@alumni.ucl.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ordifference in cultural, religious, or socioeconomic back-
ground of clinician and patient”. In such cases, “when
there is uncertainty about the match between culturally
expressed symptoms and diagnostic criteria”, attention
to cultural formulation is imperative.a Given these caveats
and advice, when clinicians encounter beliefs and forms of
experience that recall psychiatric pathology they should
not unreflectively base their judgement on their own tur-
nip patch, whether this happens to be the norms encoded
in psychiatric categories or their personal values and be-
liefs; what they should do is seek a relevant context as a
basis for judgement.
All this sounds plausible. Some account of deviation
from epistemic, social, ethical or other norms must be
given – or rather is already implied – in the diagnosis ofhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Rashed Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2013, 8:5 Page 2 of 12
http://www.peh-med.com/content/8/1/5mental disorder. However, before one can establish if a
deviation is clinically significant, it is important to judge
whether it counts as a deviation in the first place, hence
the need for a suitable context as a basis for judgement.
The context intended here is not limited to the framework
of the prospective patient and includes the individual’s
sociocultural environment. The clinician needs to estab-
lish the presence or absence of ‘cultural congruence’,
which is the degree of fit between mental states and cul-
tural norms. This cannot be resolved, as indicated, solely
by asking the patient, since what has (potentially) gone
amiss, as judged provisionally, is his or her benchmark of
what is normal or acceptable, and what is needed is an
understanding of the context within which to further
assess such a judgement. Clinicians do this on a daily
basis; they do it implicitly through the process of diagno-
sis, particularly when there is an unquestioned assumption
that patient and doctor share a cultural context. When
suspicions arise that cultural differences might impair
judgement, a benchmark other than the clinician’s be-
comes required.
There are, however, a number of conceptual and prac-
tical problems that undermine the usefulness of the cul-
tural congruence construct. Elsewhere ([3], pp. 194–198)
I presented a critique of the psychiatric approach to cul-
tural congruence. I argued, first, that it operates with a
deficient view of culture as consisting in bounded religious
groups or ethnicities to which patients can be ‘assigned’.
Second, it fails to do justice to congruence which is
treated as mere validation: once a person’s reference group
is identified, the opinion of representative (and sane) mem-
bers of that group with respect to the person’s mental states
is sought; the absence of validation supports the judgement
that the mental states are ‘abnormal’. I suggested that cul-
ture should be understood as symbols and meanings in
flux, and determining a person’s cultural reference points
is not exhausted by presumed affiliation and requires an
investigation of the myriad influences they are and have
been exposed to (see also [4,5]). Further, understanding
congruence as validation presupposes the existence of a
coherent set of norms accessible to those whose opinion
we seek and divorced from issues of power, commitments
and aesthetics, an untenable assumption given people’s
diverging priorities and concerns. Instead, I proposed,
we should seek an independent study of the cultural
epistemology – presuppositions about the limits of experi-
ence and sources of knowledge – as a basis for assessing
mental states. Then it will be seen, to invoke an example
I used in the paper, that while it might be normal for a
Lakota Indian to experience the voice of a deceased an-
cestor, a white North American having a similar experi-
ence should evoke concern.
Recently (September 2012) in the context of a University
of Glasgow project entitled ‘Debating the First Principles ofTranscultural Psychiatry’,b the authors discussed my pro-
posal [3] for a refined concept of cultural congruence and
raised a number of important issues. While generally sym-
pathetic to my attempt, they objected that it “may still
nonetheless reify culture into a static, independent entity”
([6], p. 2). This, according to Miller and colleagues in-
volves “an alienation of culture from the agency of persons”.
They asked:
Whatever the “epistemologies” of Native Americans
and “white” North Americans (populations referred to
by Rashed), were they really so bound to such
presuppositions? [and it is not clear why a] white
North American hearing the voice of the dead is
having a pathological experience, while the Lakota is
not. If it really is a matter of cultural congruence, why
not introduce the white North American to some
Lakota, or to some other white North American
voice-of-the-dead hearers? ([7], p. 6).
These are concerns that go to the heart of the matter
and raise a number of questions:
 What are the ‘presuppositions’ of a cultural context?
 Are individuals bound to cultural ‘presuppositions’?
 Are all deviations from cultural ‘presuppositions’
significant, i.e. indications of a problem or
vulnerability with the subject?
 To what extent can these deviations be detected
across cultural contexts and in clinical practice?
This paper attempts to address these questions to arrive
at a conceptually sound and useful construct of cultural
congruence. The term ‘presuppositions’ in the foregoing
questions suggests something fundamental and basic
about culture relative to which the subject’s mental states
should be aligned and against which they can be assessed.
Gaining some clarity on these issues requires an under-
standing of the concept of culture.
The paper begins with a first-person account of two
complementary ways in which culture is acquired: know-
ledge and participation. Section two builds on this account
by drawing a corresponding distinction between symbolic
and phenomenological conceptions of culture. The latter
is further developed through the articulation of the ways
in which, through participation, socially acquired mean-
ings and significances organise background intentionality.
Culture is thus not limited to symbolic presuppositions,
and extends to shaping subjects’ experiential dispositions.
Section three employs this view of culture to address the
four questions raised earlier. The main argument is that a
significant, since foundational, deviation from culture is
not from a value or a belief as such but from culturally
instilled experiential dispositions, specifically in what is
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concept of cultural congruence should be sensitive to
this distinction. Section four demonstrates how the re-
vised concept of cultural congruence can be applied, first,
in the ideal context of an extended, ethnographic research
setting and, second, in the more restrictive setting of
the clinic.
A case study in cultural learning
Genuine cultural learning is a two-faceted process; it
requires gaining knowledge of beliefs and symbols and
participation in a social context, the latter essential for
achieving shared perceptual attunement with the envir-
onment. The following first-person account draws this
distinction and serves to highlight the indispensability
of direct engagement to cultural learning, an idea that
will arise later in the article as a potentially, if partially,
surmountable obstacle to the application of the concept
of cultural congruence in the clinic.
In 2009 and 2010 I spent several months conducting
field-work in the Dakhla oasis, one of six oases in the
Western desert of Egypt. A common phenomenon in
the oasis, in fact in Egypt generally as well as other
Mediterranean societies, is the ‘evil-eye’ (‘ayn). It is an
innate capacity to do harm delivered unintentionally
through a direct look when encountering abundance or
beauty in situations that evoke genuine admiration and
appreciation. The evil eye is closely related to envy (‘hasad):
both result in harm, but with the latter this is brought
about intentionally. An envious person harbours feelings
of covetousness towards others’ possessions, health, beauty,
or any object or attribute considered desirable. In practical
usage envy also implies a wish on behalf of the envier, mo-
tivated by bitterness, to see the other person stripped of
these positive attributes. On the other hand, the evil-eye
may occur from a good, pious person, in the absence of
any intention to cause harm. It may affect animals, plants,
material possessions and human beings. People regularly
explain misfortune – for example if a tree dies or a well
dries – by saying that a person who visited recently had
given a ‘bad eye’. While it is generally understood that a
person may not be able to control the evil-eye, there are
certain protective prayers that should be invoked when
abundance and beauty are encountered.
In the first few weeks at the oasis I was able to thoroughly
learn beliefs concerning envy and the evil-eye. Shortly after,
I realised that applying this knowledge in context was not
as straightforward as I had thought. I was visiting the live-
stock shed of a Qur’anic healer I had been working with
at the time. They had three healthy, well-fed cows, one
of which was pregnant, in addition to several chickens,
goats, and a couple of sheep. As we entered, they started
the usual invocations when seeing abundance and the
healer sprinkled over the pregnant cow some blessed-water he had previously prepared. I found myself caught
in a double-bind. Not to praise what I saw is rude and
may be construed as jealousy, yet to praise too much is
to seem disingenuous or, even worse, an attempt to mask
envy. Not to look is socially unacceptable and also rude,
yet staring might be construed as ‘giving the eye’. I felt
palpable anxiety in trying to negotiate my response,
consciously and delicately: praising sincerely yet in a
measured way, looking but not staring, and sharing in
the invocations they were repeating. Knowledge of the
cultural concepts of envy and the evil-eye in a relevant
context had impacted on my responses.
In time I found myself more comfortable at negotiating
these situations. In fact, something else had occurred, a
subtle yet significant shift in my engagement with the
environment. Before, I was concerned with applying the
knowledge I had gained in order to understand why people
around me were behaving in this way and to know how I
should behave. Now, there was a natural sense of attune-
ment with the same environment which earlier I had been
at pains to interpret. And this was not a matter of speed of
interpretation, of being more adept at applying knowledge
to a situation in order to understand it. This was now my
environment of action, which did not emerge as an inter-
pretive conundrum but as a medium imbued with signifi-
cances and affordances. It was then that the experience
of a pregnant cow was transformed from something
which hitherto was only relevant in so far as thinking
about it aided the interpretation of social situations, to
something that was naturally significant, compelling me
to act in certain ways. At that point I considered myself
to have achieved genuine cultural learning in that specific
aspect of the sociocultural environment of this commu-
nity. And this occurred through a two faceted process:
knowledge of beliefs and symbols, and participation in a
social context.
The concept of culture
The concept of culture is among the more complex aca-
demic concepts. It has multiple meanings and uses within
and across different disciplines as well as the vernacular in
which it is a widely used term. Further, the concept has
changed and developed through the decades in quite rad-
ical ways, and some of its earlier conceptions, now, to us,
may appear surprisingly ethnocentric if not racist.c It is
rather important then to narrow down on those aspects
of culture that are relevant to the problem areas this
paper tackles. The preceding ‘case study in cultural learn-
ing’ goes some way towards this goal. By looking at how
culture is acquired we have come to identify the ways
in which shared meanings and significances condition
subjectivity and influence behaviour. This coheres with
the central concern of this paper, which is to understand
the relations between culture and subjectivity, when these
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not it is possible to detect this.
As I have come to learn through my experience in
Dakhla, cultural learning requires developing knowledge
of symbols and beliefs such that one is able to share a
cognitive understanding of social situations. It also
requires participation in the ebb and flow of a social
context in order to be attuned to the environment and
be moved to feel and act in an immediate and natural
way. These two facets of cultural learning correspond
to two views of culture which have developed over the
course of the second half of the 20th century: the sym-
bolic and the phenomenological. These views may be
usefully thought to differ with regards to the answer to
this question: In what ways does culture – understood as
socially acquired meanings and significances – condition
subjective experience? Symbolic views emphasise the
act of interpretation and meaning-giving, while phenom-
enological views, in addition, of course, to recognising the
symbolic order, highlight more passive, prereflective
modes of engagement with the world. In the remainder
of this section, this distinction is further highlighted and
the phenomenological view of culture is expanded upon
through the concepts of intentionality and salience. The
emerging account will provide a framework over which
a more fruitful conceptualisation of congruence can
be based.
Symbolic & phenomenological conceptions of culture
Throughout the Enlightenment, culture stood in oppos-
ition to the body, and, more generally, to nature (cf. [5]).
This opposition was replicated in the emerging discip-
line of anthropology and by the first half of the twentieth
century culture came to denote more narrowly the
“conceptual and linguistic dimensions of human exist-
ence to the exclusion of somatic, sensory, and biological
dimensions” ([8], p. 18). Leslie White, writing in 1959,
took culture to mean the “extrasomatic, temporal con-
tinuum of things and events dependent upon symboling”
([9], p. 3). Symbolic views were carried forward by Clifford
Geertz’s influential conception of culture as an
historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied
in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge
about and attitudes towards life ([10], p. 89).
Here, culture is an “interworked system(s) of constru-
able signs” that provide the context within which behav-
iour and social events can be understood among members
of a community ([10], p. 14). This is evident, for instance,
in the importance of grasping the phenomena of the evil-
eye and envy. The kind of context Geertz is after is thesubtle understanding that enables one to interpret an eye
twitch as a wink and not only an eye lid contraction. It is
the ethnographer’s task to understand such a system of
significations if she is to gain access to the conceptual
world where subjects live ([10], p. 24). In a more recent
formulation of the symbolic view, culture has been
described as “shared symbols and meanings that people
create in the process of social interaction,” where it
functions as a resource that shapes experience, inter-
pretation, and action, and “orients people in their ways
of feeling, thinking, and being in the world” ([11], p. 5).
Cultural symbols and signs invest the environment with
meaning and through being shared permit intersubject-
ive understanding and communication.
Symbolic approaches to culture have been criticized as
narrow and incomplete, and for eliminating the possibil-
ity of meaning and engagement that precede representa-
tion. They privilege culture and mind over biology and
body; culture begins where biology ends and the mind
becomes a representational machine engaged in inferen-
tial relations with objects in the world, including its
own body, and adopting the cultural framework to the-
matise and give meaning to what are culturally-neutral
experiences. Against this view, some anthropologists
(e.g. [8,12-14]) appealed to the phenomenological trad-
ition in philosophy to argue for a concept of culture
which recognises that socially acquired meanings and
significances are evident in our natural attunement with
the world. In what follows I will attempt to locate
culture phenomenologically by exploring aspects of the
concept of intentionality and its relation to salience. In
particular, I argue that far from being limited to reflective
modes of engagement, the influence of culture can be seen
in the organisation of background intentionality, specific-
ally in the automatic attentive orientation by virtue of
which certain aspects of the environment are imbued with
more salience than others.Intentionality
Intentionality is a basic characteristic of consciousness. Con-
sciousness is always consciousness of something whether
real or imagined. The memory of a friend, a hallucinated
dragon, and a perceived car are all intentional experiences
with the friend, dragon, and car being the respective
intentional objects. In Logical Investigations Husserl ([1913]
[15]) identified two inseparable aspects of intentional expe-
riences: intentional matter and intentional quality. The
former specifies the object intended and the perspective
through which it is apprehended given one’s background
and context. Perception, thus, is informed by “valences,
feelings, past experiences, and frameworks of reference
and interest” ([16], p. 115). The intentional quality, on
the other hand, specifies the type of experience; whether
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denied, or feared (cf. [17], p. 121).
The intentionality just outlined is active and thematic;
it discloses objects in the world and takes up positions
and judgements towards them. It is founded upon more
basic and passive forms of background intentionality. In
Experience and Judgement ([1948] [18]) Husserl writes:
The activity of perception, the perceptive
orientation toward particular objects, their
contemplation and explication, is already an active
performance of the ego. As such, it presupposes that
something is already pregiven to us, which we can
turn toward in perception. And it is not mere
particular objects, isolated by themselves, which are
thus pregiven but always a field of pregivenness,
from which a particular stands out and, so to speak,
“excites us” to perception and perceptive
contemplation ([18], p. 72).
Husserl then proceeds to provide a phenomenological
explication of the passive process whereby aspects of the
intentional background experience stand out and com-
mand the attention of the ego. He distinguishes two stages
in this process: the first is a tendency preceding the cogito;
a passive, prereflective stage in which various stimuli ob-
trude upon the ego accompanied by a tendency on behalf
of the ego to “give way” and be attracted as it is in its
nature ([18], p. 78). The second stage is the compliance
of the ego with the initial tendency and the turning of
the ego towards the object; a basic state of receptivity in
which the cogito becomes active and may proceed towards
reflective and thematic forms of intentionality. In this state
the ego has received “what is pregiven to it through the
affecting stimuli” ([18], p. 79).
What determines which particulars “stand out” in the
background experience prior to the activity of the ego?
How are certain particulars able to affect the ego, i.e.
to “stand out from the environment, which is always
copresent…[and] attract interest to oneself, possibly
interest in cognition” ([18], p. 30)? Husserl employs the
example of a field of sensuous data as the simplest
model to demonstrate the way in which the passive
field of perception possesses prominences and particu-
larities. The initial synthesis of a field of sensuous data
occurs though elements that contrast with others and
are raised to prominence. Homogeneity and heterogeneity
both within and across different fields, e.g. visual and audi-
tory, allow for the articulation of the field into prominences.
Through further processes of associative synthesis – in
which like and unlike elements recall or “call attention”
to each other – groups arise in the field and certain
members begin to emerge from a homogenous back-
ground ([18], pp. 72–75).Those elements which stand-out in a field, through
their intensity, begin to exert a stimulus or “obtrude”
upon the ego. Husserl gives the example of a noise or a
colour which on the basis of its intensity may exert a
powerful or weak stimulus, and may initiate a turning-
toward of the ego. But Husserl is not limiting his phenom-
enological explication to sensuous data. He indicates that
associative synthesis “holds in the same way for all data”
([18], p. 75), and that thoughts and desires, and not only
sounds or colours, can obtrude upon the ego from the
background with varying degrees of insistence ([18], p. 76).
However, as he recognises, the mode of “coming-to-
prominence” will vary: with sensuous data this will be
determined by contrasts and qualitative discontinuities
which cannot be present with non-sensuous data. Never-
theless, he writes, “among the different obscure move-
ments of thought which stir us, one thought … stands out
from all the rest and has a sensitive effect on the ego, as it,
so to speak, forces itself against the ego” ([18], p. 77).
In summary, obtrusion upon the ego is a function of a
discontinuity in a field of perception which arises on the
basis of the insistence and intensity of stimuli whether
of a sensuous or non-sensuous nature. This raises the
question: what other kinds of discontinuities are there?
A helpful distinction can be found in neuropsychological
research on salience and attention. Another way for re-
ferring to the “standing out” or “coming-to-prominence”
of aspects of a perceptual field is to say that those aspects
are more salient than others; i.e. relevant or important.
Salience
Upon encountering a visual field, the subject weighs, so
to speak, the multitude of data presented. On the basis
of this a “salience map” is constructed, which is a “repre-
sentation of the environment that weighs every input by
its local feature contrast and its current behavioural rele-
vance” ([19], p. 430). Only those elements deemed salient
become targets for saccadic eye movements and further
allocation of attentional resources. Salience research rec-
ognises two influences on the process of construction of a
“salience map” (see [20-22]). The first are “bottom-up”
influences concerned with the properties of the stimulus
itself such as colour, size, luminance and contrast. The
second are “top-down” attentional influences concerning
“prior expectation, memory or emotional association”
([22], p. 902), and where the “observer’s expectations or
intentions influence the allocation of attention” ([20],
p. 107). It is mainly the first set of influences that are
addressed by Husserl’s phenomenological explication,
influences constitutive of prominences in a field of
perception. But what about “top-down” influences?
“Top-down” influences, as suggested by salience research,
reflect the state of the subject as opposed to the state of the
stimulus. They thus reflect, as indicated, purposes, memory
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influences involve an active accomplishment of the ego
and thus do not qualify as prereflective influences on the
constitution of background intentionality. To be sure such
influences can be voluntary; they may involve an act of
will in attending to an object or constructing a theme, but
they need not always be. It is possible to conceive of
prereflective yet purposeful constructions of salience,
arguably through positing unconscious drives or repressed
memories that direct attention. In addition, and this is
the concern here, it may also be possible to conceive of
prereflective constructions of salience that are cultur-
ally, rather than individually, determined. To expand on
this point, consider the connection between cognitive
processing styles and perception.
Recent studies demonstrated cultural differences in styles
of cognitive processing among ‘Westerners’ and ‘East
Asians’. While the former are more likely to attend to
focal objects, engaging in categorisation and rule discovery,
the latter emphasise context and are more likely to attend
to a “broader perceptual and conceptual field, noticing
relationships and changes and grouping objects based
on family resemblance rather than category member-
ship” ([23], p. 11163; see also [24]). It has been hypothesised
that these cultural differences in cognitive style arise on
the basis of perceptual differences in the way attention is
automatically allocated via saccadic eye movements
and fixation to varying aspects of the environment
([23], p. 11169). Chua and colleagues [25] examined this
hypothesis by presenting pictures with a single fore-
ground object and a realistic background to American
and Chinese subjects and monitoring their eye move-
ments via a tracking device. They found that Chinese
subjects looked more at the background and were less
able to correctly identify old foreground objects that
were presented in a new background. The American
subjects looked at foreground objects sooner and longer
than the Chinese subjects. These results suggest that
there are cultural differences in the allocation of atten-
tional resources at the primary level of visual memory,
and reveals a possible reason for higher-level cognitive
differences in holistic versus focal processing of infor-
mation ([25], pp. 12631–12633).
What we have here are culturally determined top-down
influences on the construction of salience that occur prior
to the objectifying activity of the ego, complementing
bottom-up (stimulus) influences. How do these cultural
differences arise? A possible answer is through socialisa-
tion; by virtue of immersion in a specific sociocultural
context, an individual comes to internalise not only frame-
works of interpretation but also the basic and automatic
attentive orientation to the environment by virtue of
which certain aspects are imbued with more salience than
others. And what purpose do these cultural differencesreflect, i.e. why do ‘Westerners’ attend more to the fore-
ground and ‘East Asians’ to the background? The answer
put forward by Nisbett and Masuda [23] and Chua and
colleagues [25] is that differences in visual memory are a
function of differences in sociocultural conditions. The
idea is that on the basis of material, geographic and other
factors societies tend to develop distinctive social struc-
tures and practices. ‘East Asian’ societies emphasise hier-
archies, role relations and possess complex social networks.
In such a social environment, it is more important that
social actors attend to context and inter-relations than
it is to adopt an instrumental attitude to objects defined
by individual goals, and the converse holds for ‘Western’
societies. In any case, irrespective of the explanation of
why these cultural differences exist, the evidence suggests
that they do, and that they influence the automatic, top-
down allocation of attention prior to the reflective activity
of the ego.
Comments
In summary, background intentionality, understood as
salience, betrays evidence of cultural organisation prior to
the reflective activity of the ego. What we see – and not just
how we see it – is influenced by culture, and this precedes
personal and active judgements and positions. Merleau-
Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception ([1949] [26]) identi-
fies this insight when he draws a distinction between
intentionality of act, which is that of our judgements
and of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a
position … and operative intentionality, or that which
produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the
world and of our life, being apparent in our desires,
our evaluations and in the landscape we see, more
clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing
the text which our knowledge tries to translate into
precise language ([26], p. xviii).
The “landscape we see”, as Merleau-Ponty refers to it,
varies, as the studies above suggest, relative to what are
quite broad sociocultural categorisations. Individuals are
not only socialised into broad or primary social contexts
but also into local or secondary ones, as we find with
certain professions and activities. For instance, to become
a farmer one not only requires knowledge of soil types,
seasonal variations, fertilisation, and so on; one comes to
develop subtle perceptual discriminations of what to most
people is simply a patch of land. The patch of land offers a
different set of affordances, or opportunities for action, to
the farmer than to the uninitiated. This is partly on the
basis of the way in which otherwise innocuous or un-
noticed aspects of the field of perception come to promin-
ence and emerge as relevant and important; i.e. as salient.
We can thus talk of culture in terms of a broader or
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tice. In both senses of culture, we find that socially
acquired meanings and significances condition prereflective
subjective experience.
Finally, I would like to re-reflect on the ‘case study in
cultural learning’ presented in the previous section. If we
understand culture as symbols and meanings that provide
the context within which behaviour is understood, then my
knowledge of the evil-eye and envy enabled me to interpret
and respond to a complex social situation whose subtleties
would otherwise have been lost on me. If we understand
culture in the complementary phenomenological sense of
socially acquired significances evident in the organisation of
background intentionality, then my immersion and partici-
pation in the social context of Dakhla reordered my experi-
ence of the environment, aspects of which began to assume
a hitherto absent sense of salience.
Cultural congruence
Culture consists in shared meanings and significances
that condition subjective experience, influence behaviour
and permit individuals to share a cognitive and experien-
tial understanding of the world. These influences can be
apprehended at the symbolic and phenomenological
levels, with the specific nature of each level articulated
in the foregoing analysis. In what follows, this view of cul-
ture will be employed to address the questions concerning
cultural congruence which this paper started with. To
begin, the questions will be answered through adopting
the symbolic view of culture. In doing so, the limitations
of this view will become apparent and the need for
incorporating phenomenological views evident.
What are the ‘presuppositions’ of a cultural context?
If we adopt the symbolic view of culture, then presuppo-
sitions, or assumptions, in this context are beliefs about
the world that are considered basic and fundamental. To
name a few, there are presuppositions about the cosmos;
the ultimate nature of reality, the (in)existence of a
supernatural world, the place of human beings in it, the
possibility of being influenced by outside forces and to
influence others in like fashion; the nature of social inter-
action and social norms; epistemological assumptions about
the limits of experience and accepted or valued sources
of knowledge; questions of value and aesthetics, of what
people implicitly take as worthy or important.
Are individuals bound to cultural ‘presuppositions’?
What does ‘bound’ mean in this context? One way of
understanding being ‘bound’ to cultural presuppositions
is to say that certain frameworks of belief and value apply
to the person and in such a way that violating them is a
reason to judge that person's capacities. But whence do
they apply?‘Apply’ can be understood in the sense of ethically and
legally binding. For example liberal beliefs and values
concerning equality, tolerance and the right for freedom
of expression can be said to be ethically and legally binding
for individuals who exist in modern multi-cultural societies.
Violating such principles and values can be judged wrong
and in some cases illegal. Similarly, in some societies belief
in God, religious doctrine and a supernatural world can be
said to apply to individuals who live in these communities,
with various sorts of sanctions for those who reject this.
(The question of which, if any, framework should apply is
a separate one and not relevant to the issue addressed
here.) However, what we are after is not a contingent
sense in which cultural presuppositions can be said to
‘apply’ to a person but rather something that is called for
by a certain expectation of learning, such as dictated by
the nature of socialisation.
Consider this from the narrower view of professional
socialisation. If I have made a decision to become a farmer
then it is plausible to assume that, in time, beliefs and
rules pertaining to farming would apply to me such that
they can be employed to ascertain whether I am a good
farmer or not. This is just called for by my commitment
to farming, and the expectation that in a year I must have
learned something of it. If we extend this analogy to
socialisation in general we can say that through immersion
in a particular sociocultural context, an individual is
expected to have grasped and to be able to apply frame-
works of interpretation, to become part of that normal-
ity, so to speak. Failure to do so raises questions about
the reasons behind this, and doubting the subject’s
capacities arises as one, but not the only, possibility. A
central difficulty here concerns the demarcation of the
sociocultural context of relevance to the individual. With
farming and professional socialisation in general this is
relatively straightforward, but with the broader context,
specifying those influences which the person is expected
to have internalised and mastered is far from straightfor-
ward. This problem, the problem of demarcation, will be
addressed in the final section of this paper.
Are all deviations from cultural ‘presuppositions’
significant, i.e. indications of a problem or vulnerability
with the subject?
The violation of cultural presuppositions, as indicated,
invites speculation; why has this violation occurred? Is it
significant or not? Consider this, again, from the view of
professional socialisation. If I have been trying to become
a farmer for a year and at the end of it I am still unable to
understand the basics of agriculture then it is fair to say
that I am a failed farmer; that my initiation or socialisation
into ‘farmhood’ has been unsuccessful. This may be due to
(i) a problem with my capacities. But even if I fail despite
trying, other explanations present themselves: maybe
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intentionally made sure I would fail; or maybe (iii) I had
creatively appropriated and developed knowledge of farm-
ing in a way that exceeded the understanding of my
teacher. Transporting this analogy to the arena of mental
health, we have a number of candidate explanations for
the violation of norms and beliefs that lies at the heart of
social definitions of ‘deviance’: (i) dysfunctional capacitiesd
(‘mental disorder’); (ii) normal capacities (apparent violation
due to neglect or social discrimination); (iii) normal/highly
developed capacities (creativity). Only the first explanation
seems to be of health-related interest while the latter two
we may call ‘benign violations’. The question that arises
here is this: how can we distinguish benign violations from
those that are of provisional health-related interest?
Distinguishing benign and significant deviations
from culture
As indicated, it is the first explanation of deviation from
cultural presuppositions – dysfunctional capacities –
that suggests a problem or vulnerability with the subject,
and which a cogent concept of cultural congruence should
aid us in picking out. However, if we remain with symbolic
views of culture, then the concept of cultural congruence
can only tell us if norms had been broken or beliefs
violated, but cannot tell us whether these violations are
significant or not in the terms outlined here; i.e. whether
they are benign or otherwise.e And the problem goes the
other way too; not only is the concept liable to produce
false positives (benign violations taken as significant viola-
tions), there is also a risk of false negatives where a real
vulnerability may be missed because at the level of norms,
values and beliefs there is no violation with respect to cul-
tural presuppositions. But here I am begging the question:
I am invoking a vulnerability that is independent of the
violation of sociocultural norms, and that can be present
in the absence of obvious outward manifestations. To il-
luminate what is intended it is necessary to incorporate
phenomenological understandings into the concept of
cultural congruence.
As argued in the preceding section, background inten-
tionality betrays cultural organisation evident in the prere-
flective construction of salience. In this sense a significant
deviation from culture would not be from a norm, value or
belief per se but from such culturally instilled experiential
dispositions, specifically in what is salient to an individual
in a certain context. Such dispositions permit a shared ex-
perience of the world that is prereflective and foundational
to further cognitive constructions. Deviating from these
dispositions constitutes a vulnerability that may lead to
a gradual idiosyncratic and subjective rendering of shared
reality. The harm that may then ensue is on the basis of
the gradual detachment from shared reality evident in the
eventual formation of non-consensual beliefs about theworld and the negative repercussions (social and other-
wise) that tend to follow from that. Thus it is not the vul-
nerability itself that is the problem but its consequences.
This might seem to suggest that what really matters is not
the vulnerability but the beliefs that arise on its basis, pre-
cluding the need to identify it. This is true in terms of the
harm that ensues; however, the conceptual distinction that
needs to be drawn here is between non-consensual (and
potentially harmful) beliefs that are benign violations
from non-consensual (and potentially harmful) beliefs
as well as consensual (and non-harmful) beliefs that are
underpinned by a foundational vulnerability.f
A potential objection here is that within the category
‘states underpinned by a foundational vulnerability’ it will
not be possible to distinguish states of creativity from
other health-connected states. And given that the
distinction was intended to identify those cases that are,
provisionally, of health-related interest, then it fails on this
account. The objection, thus, will be that at least some
creative states are not only about the appropriation of
existing symbols in novel ways but are underpinned by a
radical, if circumscribed, deviation from shared experien-
tial dispositions. These are elaborated in ways that are
accepted or even admired by others. In responding to
this objection it is important to note that the vulnerability
intended – as the term vulnerability implies – is a potenti-
ality that may not necessarily lead to harm in the form of
an idiosyncratic rendering of shared reality. The idea is
that this vulnerability permits both positive and negative
outcomes, in the case of the former it may even be
described as a ‘gift’. It is sufficient for the distinction
drawn here that the vulnerability (or gift) is delineated
irrespective of what it may lead to. Indeed, it could be
further argued that detecting such experiential underpin-
nings may allow the provision of support to willing individ-
uals such that they develop their vulnerability/gift in ways
that promote rather than hinder their wellbeing.
Given the distinction drawn here, we can now turn to
potential application. How can we identify foundational
vulnerabilities – or deviations from shared experiential
dispositions – in practice? And how is this to be accom-
plished without relying on the violation of cultural pre-
suppositions which, as argued, cut across this vulnerability?
The key is to attend to it directly. The following section
illustrates how this can be done, first, through the context
of participant observation as provided for in prolonged
ethnographic research and engagement with subjects and,
second, in the context of the clinic.
Cultural congruence in practice
In the ‘field’
Ahmedg is a young man I met during my research. After
enduring a humiliating beating at the hands of his school
teacher before the entire morning assembly he decided to
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his finals and his father urged him to return. He was
particularly angered at his father’s refusal to confront the
teacher and secure his dignity. He left home and isolated
himself in a deserted mud-brick house owned by his
family; he was too embarrassed to face the village follow-
ing his humiliation. His mother was intensely saddened by
her son’s sudden change in fortune, and suspected that he
was subject to envy or perhaps magic, a common explan-
ation in the oasis for these kinds of situations. The pres-
ence of magic was more or less confirmed when she
found a small, square black bundle at home, recognised in
town as a magician’s hex. She proposed to take him to a
healer who could identify the evil influence and hopefully
dispel it.
Before proceeding further with describing Ahmed’s
predicament, it is necessary to provide some background
information on magic and healing in the oasis. On an
initial survey of the community, one would learn that the
practices of magicians and healers are opposed; healers
heal using the Qur’an (the word of God) and are on the
side of good; magicians deploy the jinn (spirits of fire)
through hexes and talismans to wreak havoc with a person
and are on the side of evil. As I spent more time in Dakhla
I realised that this neat distinction was not the whole
truth. As far as people are concerned, and regardless of
what a certain healer would claim, a common belief is that
a very thin line separates healers from magicians and it
is frequently crossed. This belief is supported by the fol-
lowing chain of thought: healers are human and cannot
represent pure good which is something only Prophets
are capable of. This renders them vulnerable to sin like
everyone else, especially the sin of greed. By claiming to
be healers people would trust them and seek them,
yet by secretly engaging in magic they would compel
people (through spells) to keep returning, thus making
money off them on both counts. Given this widespread
suspicion, it is natural that the people of Dakhla, who
continue to take their afflictions to healers, are attuned
to signs indicating that the healer they are now seeing
also dabbles in magic.
After attending many healing sessions with various
healers I found myself adept at detecting a presumed magi-
cian as some of the locals were. There is no written or
agreed upon framework for making the distinction, and the
key lies in subtle and highly subjective signs such as short,
suspicious pauses during the Qur’anic reading. During these
pauses, it is alleged, the healer/magician would slip the ne-
cessary talismans by silently invoking them or by making
certain gestures with his fingers. Through my prolonged en-
gagement with these sessions, gestures and movements
which I might not have noticed before assumed a height-
ened salience for me. These otherwise meaningless move-
ments engaged my attention and demanded interpretation.Now Ahmed, at the suggestion of his family, consulted
several healers. On one of these sessions, which was also
to be the final one, things did not go very well. The man
put up some incense as all healers do but while reading
the specified Qur’anic verses the ashes fell to the ground
and formed a square shape resembling the hex his mother
had found; this seemed to Ahmed an incriminating sign.
Two days later he found a dead cat at the family home,
and drew a link between the death and the magician who
had conducted the consultation in the same building.
Combined, these two events left no doubt in Ahmed’s
mind that the man really was a magician who was going
to hurt rather than cure him. He refused to see him any
further, and refused to see any other healers. Ahmed’s
parents did not object to his refusal, in fact, they agreed
with their son – as did their neighbours – that the man
was probably a magician. When I asked why they thought
so, they reiterated the common belief that most healers
actually are; they do it to make more money but would
never admit it. More specifically, they concurred with
Ahmed that the similarity between the shape left by the
ashes and the shape of the hex, and the death of the cat so
soon after the healer’s visit, were evidence that that man
was a magician.
Ahmed thus arrived at a consensual belief concerning
the status of the healer who visited him. This belief was
not only shared with his family and neighbours but also
fitted in with the general mood in the community re-
garding healers/magicians. But how did he arrive at this
belief? Two experiences and interpretations: the fallen
ashes and the dead cat. With regards to the dead cat, it
is a common belief that animals are sensitive to the
presence of evil, sometimes to the point of death. That
particular interpretation is quite straightforward. How-
ever, his interpretation of the fallen ashes is unusual, or,
rather, not the interpretation as such but the very fact of
taking the ashes as significant at all. As indicated above,
and as I learnt through participation, what is significant
or salient in the healing context with regards to the
identification of magicians are pauses and gestures that
indicate a talisman is being invoked. For Ahmed, how-
ever, the range of what is salient was broader and idio-
syncratic, suggesting a deviation from culturally instilled
experiential dispositions. This deviation constitutes a
vulnerability as defined in the previous section, even if
in Ahmed’s case others agreed with his interpretations.
In fact, it is because of this agreement that we could say
the vulnerability was masked by consensus in belief.h
In the clinic
Having identified the vulnerability that lies at the heart
of cultural (in)congruence, a vulnerability which cuts across
social violations in norms, values and beliefs, the final ques-
tion can now be addressed: is it possible to apply this richer
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given the argument of this paper and the preceding case
study, I will enumerate the different domains of know-
ledge and experience an observer is required to be familiar
with in order to make cogent judgments of cultural (in)
congruence:
(i) Identify a relevant sociocultural context.
(ii)Learn about this context: meanings and symbols
which, in principle, others can tell us about, and
perceptual alignment that can only be fully gained
through participation.
(iii)Learn about the subject’s experiences and the
foundation of her beliefs.
(iv)Apply the knowledge gained in (ii) in order to
derive a view on the presence of otherwise of a
vulnerability with the subject.
In the extended context of several months field-work
and my extensive engagement with Ahmed, realising
these four domains was achievable, enabling me to come
up with the view explicated in the preceding case-study.
This is clearly challenging in clinical contexts, where clini-
cians do not have the time, resources or expertise to apply
cultural congruence in the way it has been expounded
here. However, it may be possible to salvage something
useful in terms of clinical applications if we carefully
attend to the above domains.
First, in relation to identifying a relevant context, it
should be clear that we are not after a label of so and so
a culture or ethnicity whether this is assumed or provided
by the individual. The assumption of bounded entities
called cultures is untenable and cultural labels are at
best heuristic devices that can serve as starting points
for learning about a social context. Whether the subject
is Pentecostal, Nubian, Maori or North-American while
not irrelevant is not at all sufficiently instructive. The
relevant social context is the actual context in which
the individual lives and thrives and from where she
draws, or is expected to draw, her fundamental inter-
pretive frameworks and perceptual tendencies. In this
sense, reducing a person’s sociocultural context to a
label rather than exploring the intricacies of her or his
actual environment is analogous to believing that if we
wish to learn about a child’s home environment, all we
need to do is consult local council statistics on employ-
ment and income in the neighbourhood. While we might
learn something from the latter, it certainly is no substi-
tute to contact with the child and the family.
Second, in relation to learning about this context, and
given that it is highly unrealistic to expect clinicians to
conduct fieldwork, there appears to be no solution here
apart from seeking the best available knowledge but with
a number of caveats in mind. The most obvious sourceof knowledge about the subject’s sociocultural context is
his or her family members. Naturally they can provide
valuable information both about the context as well as
the subject. But it must be noted that this information is
likely only to tackle symbolic dimensions of culture in
addition to suffering with the problems of testimony
such as bias, partial knowledge, expertise, and so on.
Therefore, another important complementary source of
knowledge is anthropologists with expertise on the com-
munity. Recent trends in anthropology favour phenomeno-
logical and what are called “experience-near” approaches
to research. Works conducted in this methodological
and theoretical framework, so long as they are current
and relevant, may be particularly helpful since they go
beyond culture as belief and attempt to explicate culture
as a foundation of experience, a concern articulated in
this paper and deemed important to a coherent concept
of cultural congruence.
Part of the challenge here is to recognise that making
judgements of (in)congruence requires access to domains
of knowledge and expertise that lie outside the psychia-
trist’s purview; appealing to other ‘experts’ is therefore
unavoidable. However, this should be done with the above
caveats in mind. For instance, appealing to a clinical depart-
ment’s resident anthropologist or to the ‘Muslim Imam’ are
helpful to the extent that either are deeply familiar with
the subject’s actual sociocultural world, and are not just
academically or externally acquainted as such.
Finally, assuming the first two issues have been addressed,
domains three and four can proceed with relative ease.
After all it is within a clinician’s remit and expertise to
understand the subject’s experiences and enter her world.
Conclusion
The psychiatric conceptualisation and application of cul-
tural congruence may not help in detecting those who
are vulnerable and may mislead into pathologising those
who are not at risk. To address this problem, this paper
sought to explore the concept, arguing that congruence
should accommodate symbolic as well as phenomeno-
logical dimensions of culture. Given the view developed
here, a richer sense of (in)congruence concerns alignment
with or deviation from culturally instilled experiential dis-
positions which are foundational to a shared experience
of the world. The problems of applying the concept in
the richer sense articulated here have been noted. Clearly,
from a practical point of view, the whole procedure will
benefit if the clinical encounter is designed as a drawn-out
and slowly unfolding process where knowledge of the
sociocultural context is gained and developed one session
after another as more and more people become involved
and a genuine contextualisation of the subject’s experi-
ences and beliefs is achieved – in a sense resembling
ethnographic fieldwork. While this may not be ideal in
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and treat, it might be essential for drawing a distinction
between those cases where the subject is benignly express-
ing and realising a cultural script and others where this
script is masking an unfolding vulnerability that might





(accessed March 2013). Project was funded by the Arts
and Humanities Research Council of England.
cIn its original usage culture referred to activity; the
“tending of natural growth” ([27], p. xvi). It denoted culti-
vating the land, breeding animals and looking “after one’s
livelihood especially in its material aspects” ([8], p. 16). In
Europe of the late middle-ages the locus of cultivation
shifted and culture was identified with ‘civilisation’, denot-
ing intellectual accomplishment and refinement and
separating the European bourgeoisie from peasants and
savages. In 18th and 19th century Europe, culture took
an extended meaning when it began to be used as a
noun in the context of developing nationalistic ideas
that conceived of a nation as an exponent of a particular
and unique world-view such as ‘Germanic Culture’ or
‘French Culture’. Immanuel Kant, in 1798, writes about
the ‘character of the peoples’, describing the French as
courteous, lovable and vivacious while the Englishman
is self-sufficient, “claims only respect, and … wants only
to live as he pleases” ([28], p. 214–217). The transform-
ation of culture into a thing rather than an activity, and
the association of this with what were thought of as
higher values and accomplishments brought about dis-
criminatory uses of culture. In 1869, Matthew Arnold
was critical of the Victorian conception of culture which
“plumes itself on a smattering of Greek and Latin” and
is valued as “an engine of social and class distinction,
separating its holder, like a badge or title, from other
people who have not got it ([29], p.4). By the late 19th
century the term ‘culture’ was taken into the academic
discipline of anthropology. In Primitive Culture, Edward
Tylor provided the first sufficiently abstract definition:
“culture or civilisation .. is that complex whole which in-
cludes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a mem-
ber of a society”([30], p. 1). Here there is recognition of
the universality of culture – everyone has culture – albeit
within a paradigm of progression where ‘primitive culture’
was considered inferior to the rationally minded and
technologically advanced ‘European culture’. Tylor op-
erated within an evolutionary conception of civilisation
where the ‘lower tribes’ were less developed than the
‘higher nations’.d‘Capacity’ in this context refers to the ability to learn
and apply shared frameworks of meaning and value.
eCultural congruence in this sense would provide us
with an insight into the moral and social registers of the
mental states in question; whether a group of people
think they are good, desirable, right, wrong or useful.
These assessments are open to change and disagreement
and are bound up with broader factors such as power and
social relations. The question of the moral and social view
of mental states is separate from the question of whether
those mental states are significant, i.e. underpinned by a
vulnerability, even if the answer to both questions may at
times concur.
fThis distinction does not depend on the presence of
distress. If we were only after the alleviation of distress,
we need not worry about cultural congruence, only about
managing the distress. However, in seeking congruence
we are concerned with subjects' embeddedness in their
social environment, and this is of concern irrespective
of distress. This embeddedness is characterised here in
terms of partaking in shared perceptual alignments.
gConfidentiality and anonymity is upheld with regards
to all study participants: no actual names are used and data
that can aid identification has been omitted or changed.
Ethical approval for the research on which this case
study is based was obtained from University College
London Research Ethics Committee (Project ID: 1521/001).
hIn this case study, a vulnerability is masked by the
presence of surface congruence in belief. Alternatively,
the absence of surface congruence in belief need not imply
that there is a vulnerability. Consider, for example, the
case of a young man who joins a religious institution
where the experiential dimensions of faith are encouraged.
Members come to learn to attend to somatic sensations
and thoughts and to re-interpret the origin and signifi-
cance of these as the Spirit going through their body. The
person’s mother and regular priest are concerned that this
exceeds the bounds of normal experience and belief. In
terms of the argument of this paper, there would be no
vulnerability here. Through the religious sessions the man
learnt to regard as salient aspects of experience that
normally go unnoticed and to reinterpret those through a
new framework.
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